Rapid advances in wireless networking technologies have enabled mobile devices to be connected anywhere and anytime. While roaming, applications on these devices dynamically discover hosts and services with whom interactions can be started. However, the fear of exposure to risky transactions with potentially unknown entities may seriously hinder collaboration. To minimise this risk, an engineering approach to the development of trust-based collaborations is necessary. This paper introduces hTrust, a human trust management model and framework that facilitates the construction of trust-aware mobile systems and applications. In particular, hTrust supports: reasoning about trust (trust formation), dissemination of trust information in the network (trust dissemination), and derivation of new trust relationships from previously formed ones (trust evolution). The framework views each mobile host as a self-contained unit, carrying along a portfolio of credentials that are used to prove its trustworthiness to other hosts in an ad-hoc mobile environment. Customising functions are defined to capture the natural disposition to trust of the user of the device inside our trust management framework.
INTRODUCTION
Portable devices, such as palmtop computers, mobile phones, personal digital assistants, digital cameras and the like, have gained wide popularity. Their computing capabilities are growing quickly, while their size is shrinking, allowing their pervasive use in our everyday life. Wireless networks of increasing bandwidth allow these mobile units to aggregate and form complex distributed system structures, as well as to seamlessly connect to fixed networks while they change location. The combined use of these technologies enables people to access their personal information, as well as public resources and services, anytime and anywhere.
Each time an interaction takes place, we face an inherent risk, as we can never be certain of the trustworthiness of the entities we interact with, or that mediate the interaction. This risk is not peculiar to mobile settings only, but it characterises any distributed setting, that is, any situation where we are giving up complete control, thus becoming vulnerable to somebody's else behaviour. For example, during an e-commerce transaction, we trust the service provider will not misuse our credit card details; when downloading and executing a piece of software, we trust it will not harm our device, and so on. In mobile ad-hoc settings, however, the perceived risk is higher, because of the easiness with which services and information can be accessed, the anonymity of the entities we interact with, the speed at which new entities come into reach while others disappear, and so on.
In order to advance the goal of anywhere-anytime computing, and to fully exploit the potential of current technologies to promote non-trivial interactions among entities, the exposure to risky transactions has to be reduced as much as possible. An engineering approach to the development of trust-based collaborations is thus necessary. This requires the existence of a trust management framework (TMF) that enables devices to form, maintain and evolve trust opinions. These opinions are of fundamental importance as they can be used to drive the configuration of the system in a variety of ways: for example, to decide from where to download a file, what service provider to contact, what access rights to grant, and so on. Trust is obviously not the only aspect that must be taken into account when making these decisions: the perceived risk inherent to a transaction, and the quality of service (QoS) requirements, will all contribute to the final configuration decisions. For example, low risk transactions can still take place in untrusted environments, while high risk transactions may not take place even in highly trusted ones. Also, a transaction that requires the investment of large amounts of resources (e.g., bandwidth and battery) to be carried on in a low trusted environment may be blocked, because of QoS constraints. Feelings of trust, risk and QoS can be formed independently of each other, and thus dealt with separately, before being combined. In this paper, we are concerned with trust management only.
In traditional distributed systems, trust decisions were mainly centralised: the existence of clearly-defined administrative boundaries, and the limited mobility of entities, allowed a trusted third party (TTP) (e.g., the local administrator) to store information about the entities belonging to that domain; the TTP was then contacted when a trust decision had to be made (for example, to establish the access rights of an entity to a resource). This trust management model is based on assumptions that do not hold in the mobile setting: first, a globally available infrastructure that holds trust information is missing, and thus the centralised approach is inapplicable. Second, while entities are mostly fixed and known in a centrally administered distributed system, entities are dynamic and anonymous in mobile settings. In the first case, knowing an entity usually coincides with trusting an entity; in the second case, we often have to make a trust decision about entities we have never seen, or about whom we only have partial knowledge. Distrusting the unknown would cut down the possibility to engage fruitful interactions; however, we cannot blindly trust everyone, as anonymity is very appealing to malicious entities against which we want to be protected. To foster the vision of the mobile device as an 'extension' of the human being, and to promote complex and safe interactions in the pervasive scenario, a human-tailored trust management model and framework have to be developed that programmers can use to build trust-aware systems and applications.
A trust management model for mobile ad-hoc systems must be subjective, that is, it must enable the (user of the) mobile application to form its trust opinions; delegating trust decisions to an external entity (the TTP) would in fact inevitably lose the individuality that is the essence of human trust. Decentralised approaches have been proposed, where trust decisions are locally made based on recommendations that are spread across the network via recommendation exchange protocols. However, current approaches fail to be fully satisfactory for the following two reasons: first, they completely rely on the assumption that entities have a social conscience that will make them exchange trust information whenever asked, although no incentives are provided to induce entities to do so. In a resource constrained environment, selfishness is likely to prevail over cooperation, for example, to save battery power. Second, the trust decision that each entity locally makes tends to be fully automated, with very little or no customisation allowed. We argue that a trust management model should be highly customisable instead, to capture the varying and complex natural disposition of an individual to trust into computer models. This should be achieved without causing disruption to the device computation and communication resources.
Our research goal is to develop a formal abstract treatment of trust that meets the above requirements, and offer programmers an infrastructure they can use in practice to build trust-aware systems. In this paper, we advance this goal by introducing hTrust, a human-based trust management model and framework that a mobile system can exploit to form trust opinions, without the burden of, for example, keeping trust information updated, or propagating trust information in the network. The model is completely decentralised: each host acts as a self-contained unit, carrying along a portfolio of credentials derived from its past interactions, and that it uses to prove its trustworthiness to others. Customising functions are used to capture the natural disposition to trust of the user of the device, thus enabling human-tailored trust reasoning. Although dangers are an intrinsic part of mobile settings, and thus cannot be completely eliminated, hTrust exploits these functions to dynamically detect malicious behaviours, and consequently isolate untrusted entities from future interactions.
The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 provides a definition of trust and spells out the principles and assumptions our model is based upon. In Section 3 we describe our trust management model in details, and in Section 4 we discuss its suitability to the mobile setting and report on some open issues. Section 5 compares our approach to related works and, finally, Section 6 concludes the paper.
PRINCIPLES OF TRUST
Prior to describing our trust management model, we define what we mean by trust, and spell out some of its commonly accepted characteristics. Despite extensive studies from sociologists, philosophers, and psychologists, a universally accepted definition of trust is still missing 1 . One of the most commonly accepted definitions, and the one we refer to, is from sociologist Diego Gambetta [12] : "... trust (or, symmetrically, distrust) is a particular level of the subjective probability with which an agent will perform a particular action, both before [we] can monitor such action (or independently of his capacity of ever be able to monitor it) and in a context in which it affects [our] own action."
A first observation is that trust is subjective: it is the degree of belief about the behaviour of other entities, also called 'agents', upon which we depend (for example, to have a service delivered). These beliefs regard both the intentions (not) to cheat, and the skills to perform adequately to intentions. Trust is asymmetric, that is, two agents need not have similar trust in each other, and context-dependent, in that trust in a specific environment does not necessarily transfer to another. Trust is dynamic and it tends to be reduced if entities are misbehaving; vice-versa, it increases if agents are doing well. There is no absolute definition of what 'doing well' means, and therefore different observers may have different perceptions of the same agent's trustworthiness.
A trust management framework thus characterises as a self-adjusting system used to form, exchange and evolve trust information about the agents that populate the network. We refer to this network as to the social context, in order to distinguish it from the transactional context, that is a network of producers/consumers that interact to deliver services. A transactional context uses the trust information available from the social context in order to customise the way transactions take place, that is, to configure the system. As pointed out before, risks and QoS issues must also be taken into account when customising a transaction. In this paper, we are not concerned with how these three parameters, that is, trust, risk and QoS, can be combined to dynamically configure the system. Even before this can happen, trust opinions about other agents must be formed. In this paper, we define such a trust management framework.
Closely related to trust management is the issue of identification: we must be able to bind a trust opinion to an identity; however, the nature of mobile settings is such that creation and deletion of identities is very easy, and malicious agents could exploit it to repeatedly misbehave, without being isolated. Authentication systems based on public-key cryptography (e.g., [7, 18] ) do not solve the issue, as there is nothing there preventing an agent to have multiple pairs of keys, thus multiple identities, so that misbehaviours related to one identity cannot be traced back to another. We do not try to address the issue of identification in our trust management framework. We assume each agent has got a pair of public/private keys (perhaps more than one), that is managed via an independent, self-organised public-key management system, and that the agent is known in the system by means of a pseudonym that may be the public key itself. However, based on this assumption, our TMF aims to detect potential cheaters (i.e., agents that maliciously create new public/private keys to conceal past misbehaviours), and alert the application about their presence.
HTRUST
An overview of the trust management model we have developed is depicted in Figure 1 . The model comprises three core components: trust dissemination, trust formation, and trust evolution. Whenever an agent a, called the trustor, has to decide whether to trust another agent b, called the trustee, trust information about b has to be collected. In our model, sources of trust information are: direct experiences, credentials and recommendations. Direct experiences represent an agent's history of interaction (in this case, past interactions between a and b); they are kept in the trustor's local environment by the TMF. Credentials are somehow the symmetric of direct experiences: they represent what other agents thought of us in previous interactions (for example, what agent x thought of b); they are kept in the trustee's local environment by the TMF. Recommendations are trust information coming from other agents in the social context; the TMF propagates them by means of the trust dissemination component. Trust information is then processed by the trust formation component of the trustor agent, to predict the trustee's trustworthiness. Assuming the interaction takes place, feedback about b's trustworthiness, as perceived by a, is given in input to the trust evolution component, whose goal is to update a's local environment.
In the following sections, we describe the core components of our trust management framework, that is, trust formation, trust dissemination and trust evolution. As the picture shows, these components sit in between the applications and a communication middleware that enables the agent to interact with other agents in the system. The goal of the TMF is to take the burden of maintaining and propagating trust information away from the application; at the same time, subjective reasoning is made possible by means of a number of customising functions that capture the human disposition to trust of the entity involved in the trust decision process (i.e., the user of the device). These functions will be discussed in the following sections when encountered. While the discussion proceeds, we will also incrementally describe what information constitutes an agent's local environment.
Trust Formation
We call trust formation the process that enables a trustor agent to predict a trustee's trustworthiness before the interaction takes place. In this section, we describe both the information that the TMF uses to predict the trustworthiness of an agent, and the trust formation function that the TMF provides to compute a prediction.
Trust Data Model
As we said before, a trustor a forms a trust opinion about a trustee b based on a's direct experiences with b, b's credentials, and recommendations coming from the social context. The trustor's direct experiences with b are processed by the TMF and kept locally in the form of a single aggregated trust information tuple:
The meaning of the tuple is as follows: agent a trusts agent b at level l to carry on service s in context c. For example, we may specify that Alice (a) trusts Bob's eBookshop (b) at level 0.8 (l) to sell books (s) that are specialised on travel (c). The trust level l varies in a range [−1, 1], with −1 meaning total distrust, and 1 meaning blind trust. The trust level will be higher if interactions happened in the transactional context have been positive experiences, and viceversa. Because in mobile ad-hoc settings agents can have only a partial knowledge of their surroundings, their trust opinions contain a level of uncertainty. In order to distinguish between 'don't trust' (i.e., trust-based decision) from 'don't know' (i.e., lack of evidence), we explicitly model the degree of knowledge k in the trust opinion expressed. This knowledge varies in a range [0, 1], with 0 meaning unknown, and 1 meaning perfect knowledge; the higher the number of direct experiences happened between the trustor and the trustee, the higher the degree of knowledge. The distinction between trust and knowledge has been explicitly made in [8] first. However, they do not model a third important parameter, that is time. The trustor's knowledge k decays with time; we thus associate, to each tuple, a timestamp t, indicating at which time the knowledge k refers to. If only an agent's direct experiences are aggregated, we talk about trust reflexivity (i.e., the agent trusts only his own experiences). However, in some circumstances, we may want to take other agents' experiences into account as well; we talk, in this case, of trust transitivity. Both direct and indirect experiences may thus be combined in a single aggregated tuple: we will discuss in Section 3.3 how the TMF on each agent maintains this information updated. In this paper, we are not interested in the specific ontology used to encode service and context information (parameters s and c respectively); we thus simplify the notation and describe an aggregated trust tuple made by agent a about b as at = [a, b, l, k, t] ∈ A, A being the set of all aggregated tuples.
Aggregated tuples are the primary source of information to predict trust. When this information is not available (e.g., because no interaction has ever happened in the past between the trustor and the trustee), or in case this information is not reliable (e.g., because it is outdated), the trustor may ask other agents in the social context to provide him with recommendations. For example, Alice may be willing to buy books from Bob's eBookshop provided that it has been recommended by Clare (agent x). A recommendation tuple sent by x about agent b looks like:
R being the set of all recommendations. A recommendation is thus computed by signing the local aggregated tuple; a signature is necessary to prove the recommendation's authenticity. We refer to x and b as to the agent's names; they are the piece of information they are known for in the system (e.g., their public key). We will discuss in Section 3.2 the protocol used by the TMF to propagate recommendations in the social context. Aggregated tuples and recommendations condense an arbitrary long history of direct and indirect interactions into a single tuple. While this has the advantage of minimising the memory required to store trust information, it has also the drawback of losing proof of individual interactions. This approach has been proven to have a number of limitations [22] : for example, an agent cannot defend himself against defamation, nor can he self-recommend himself. On the other hand, dealing only with evidences of single interactions would saturate the system quickly. hTrust overcomes the limitations of these two extreme approaches by combining aggregated tuples and recommendations with credentials. Each agent b carries with him (i.e., in his local environment) a portfolio of credentials, that is, a set of letters of presentation detailing how trustworthy b has been in one or more previous interactions. Each credential looks like:
meaning that agent x considers b trustworthy at level l to carry on service s in context c. This trust level refers to a set of transactions happened in the past between x and b; assuming each agent counts the number of interactions occurred with any other agent in the system, the trust level in the credential refers to the sequence of transactions numbered n f rom to nto, the last of which happened at time t. When n f rom coincides with nto, the credential is a proof of an individual transaction. For example, Bob's eBookshop may have a credential, given to him by Clare, stating that Clare herself considered Bob trustworthy at level 0.9 when she bought there travel books during their 10 th transaction (n f rom = nto = 10) which happened at time t. Each credential is signed with the accreditor's (i.e., x) private key, so to prove its authenticity; the trustee b can thus use its set of credentials both to self-recommend himself to other agents, and to defend himself against defamation. We will detail in Section 3.2 how credentials are formed and exchanged. To simplify the discussion, we will describe a credential tuple given by agent x to b as ct = [x, b, l, n1, n2, t] ∈ C, C being the set of all credentials.
We said before we are not interested in particular services and contexts to which trust information refers. There is, however, a service of particular importance, provided by virtually every agent in the system, that we model explicitly: the service of supplying the recommendations themselves. In human interactions, we tend to value more recommendations coming from people who have given us good recommendations in the past (i.e., people with whom we shared opinions), while discarding recommendations coming from unknown recommenders, or from recommenders with whom we have divergence of opinions. Agents are thus judged based on the quality of the recommendations they give, in the same way they are assessed for any other service they provide. Information about the trustworthiness of a recommender agent x can thus be kept by a trustor agent a in the form of an aggregated tuple, where the service parameter s is set to 'recommender':
The interpretation of this tuple is the same provided for aggregated tuples: a trusts x at level l to provide recommendations (service s) in a certain context c. For example, Alice may trust Clare at level 0.7 to recommend travel books; this, however, does not imply that Alice trusts Clare also on recommendations regarding what stock market to invest in, as contexts are different. The trustor has knowledge k at time t about this information. The higher the number of good recommendations received from x in the past, the higher the trust level, and vice-versa. Also, the higher the number of recommendations received from x, the better the knowledge of x; as before, this knowledge decays with time, and we thus have to record at what time the information contained in the tuple refers to. We refer to these tuples as to tacit information tuples, both to distinguish them from other aggregated information and to cater for the fact that, as we will show in Section 3.3, the TMF tacitly extracts them from observations of direct experiences. We will refer to a tacit information tuple as to tt = [a, x, l, k, t] ∈ T , T being the set of all tacit information tuples.
Trust Formation Function Υ
A trustor a willing to predict the trustworthiness of a trustee b, uses the trust formation function Υ our framework provides. A formal definition of Υ can be found in Figure 2 ; before describing step by step the computation it performs, we illustrate the two auxiliary functions Υ1 and Υn that Υ is based upon. In the following, when a formula applies to both aggregated tuples, credentials and recommendations, we will simply refer to a generic tuple gt ∈ G, G being A ∪ C ∪ R.
Function Υ1. When predicting trust, the trust level l expressed in a generic tuple gt has to be scaled down, depending on the knowledge the tuple embeds, and on the time elapsed since when that trust opinion was formed. The function Υ1 serves this purpose: given in input a tuple gt, Υ1 first computes a new predicted trust value f that takes into consideration the uncertainty inherent to gt; it then derives a predicted trust range, based on the trust level π l (gt) experienced in the past, and the discrepancy between this value and the prediction f . T and N are parameters belonging to the trustor local environment e, T representing the time interval during which interactions are observed, N representing the number of interactions after which knowledge can be considered maximum. For example, let us consider Function Υn. As previously discussed, we value trust opinions coming from other agents (i.e., credentials and recommendations) differently, depending on the quality of these agents (i.e., whether, in the past, they have provided several and accurate recommendations). Given a set of n credentials or recommendations, Υ1 is first applied to each of them, to obtain a set of trust ranges that cater for time and knowledge uncertainty; Υn is then computed to derive a unique range, by means of a weighed average of the individual ranges lower and upper limits. Each weight qi in the formula represents the quality of the accreditor/recommender i and it is computed based on his trustworthiness l i , the trustor's knowledge k i about him, and the time elapsed since when i's last credential/recommendation was received. The tacit (so that qx = 0.9 * 0.8 = 0.72, without considering time uncertainty), we obtain, in a single step of the summation, the addends 0.54 * 0.72 = 0.39 and 0.66 * 0.72 = 0.48, for the lower and upper limits respectively (i.e., the breadth of the range is preserved, although scaled down to cater for the quality of the recommender). Note that not all credentials/recommendations are used to compute a prediction: only those coming from agents whose quality qi is greater than a minimum level η contribute to the final result. Also, to avoid considering the same tuple more than once, we assume that only credentials/recommendations with timestamp πt(gti) > πt(tti) are processed.
Tacit Formation Function Υ. Given in input an aggregated tuple at ∈ A, taken from a's local environment e ∈ E, a set of credentials C ∈ ℘(C) supplied by the trustee b, and a set of recommendations R ∈ ℘(R) coming from the social context, the trust formation function Υ first computes three independent trust ranges, by means of the auxiliary functions Υ1 and Υn. It then uses a customising function h1 to synthesise one trust range, given three ranges in input. This function will vary from agent to agent, depending on the natural disposition to trust of the agent itself. For example, h1 may consider the local aggregated trust information only, thus relying solely on the trustor's past experiences (trust reflexivity); vice-versa, credentials and recommendations alone can be used (trust transitivity), for example, to delegate trust to third parties. More generally, a combination of the three will be used; for example, h1 ([l1, l2] 
, with w1 +w2 +w3 = 1, 0 ≤ wi ≤ 1. We represent the final prediction as an interval, rather than as a single value, to cater for the approximate nature of trust due to incomplete knowledge. Mobile applications can derive a single trust value out of the predicted range, either by means of one of hTrust customising functions (e.g., see h3 in Section 3.3.1), or by applying some more advanced, application-specific reasoning, if needed. Note that there may be an overlap between credentials and recommendations, that is, the accreditor of a credential may also be a recommender. To avoid the same experience being accounted for more than once by the trust formation function, we require the sets C and R to be properly pruned, so that an agent appears either as an accreditor or as a recommender, but not as both.
Trust Dissemination
The trust formation function described before uses credentials and recommendations to predict the trustworthiness of a trustee b; these tuples become particularly important when b is unknown to the trustor a, so that there is no aggregated trust information to rely on. In these circumstances, the following protocol for the dissemination of credentials and recommendations is used; the protocol guarantees a a minimum set information upon which to base the prediction, even in the case agents are selfish and, having to decide whether to answer a request for recommendations, or to save battery power, choose the latter.
Step (m) . The protocol starts with a sending b (notation a → b) a request to see his portfolio of credentials; the parameter m indicates the maximum number of letters a is willing to receive from b.
Step
The trustee b replies with a set of at most m letters of presentation (the ones he considers to be the best for his own reputation).
Step 3. The TMF decrypts the letters of presentation received, relying on an independent key management system to receive the public-keys of the agents that have signed the letters. The local trust formation function Υ is then used to form a trust opinion about b, based on the information contained in the decrypted letters. However, this information may not be enough, leaving the predicted value too uncertain. In this case, the TMF queries the social context to receive recommendations about b. Note that this request may bring no additional information to a, in case agents in the social context do not reply. No more information can now be collected; the function Υ is used again to synthesise a predicted trust interval.
Step 4. At this point, interaction between a and b may or may not take place in their transactional context; this does not only depend on the result of the trust formation function, but also on risks and QoS needs related to the specific transaction. In case the interaction takes place, our protocol demands that, upon its completion, a and b exchange a letter a presentation: a → b : [a, b, l , n, n, t]SK a , and b → a : [b, a, l , n, n, t]SK b . The tuple signed by b becomes a letter of presentation for a and vice-versa. This is a far less demanding assumption than requiring an agent to answer all requests for recommendations coming from neighbours. Note that the credential refers only to the just completed interaction (numbered n by both agents, as this is the n th interaction between the two of them). The more an agent interacts, the higher the number of credentials he has to manage; to avoid saturation, a may ask b to provide him with a credential that summarises a sequence of n previous interac- Note that a cannot cheat and do this computation by himself, as the accreditor's signature is required. Also, although the content of each credential can be read using the accreditor's public key P K b , a cannot selectively drop credentials (for example, to discard a negative evidence) without being discovered, as they are sequentially numbered; for the same reason, b cannot provide a with a falsified averaged credential. Concealments of individual credentials to agents other than the accreditor are still possible; however, as we have seen in the previous section, an individual credential has much lower weight than an averaged one, and to obtain an averaged one a complete sequence is needed.
The trust formation function Υ is applied at three different stages of the recommendation exchange protocol: prior to its execution, after the portfolio of credentials has been obtained from the trustee, and then again once (and if) further recommendations have been received from the social context. Every time, the returned result of the Υ function is used to decide whether to proceed with the following step of the protocol or not. This decision depends on a customising function h2 : [−1, 1] × [−1, 1] → {0, 1} that, given in input a predicted trust range, decides whether the prediction is accurate enough (return 1), or whether further information should be acquired (return 0). What exactly is enough, depends once again on the natural disposition to trust of the agent. Possible examples of this function include: h2(l1, l2) = 0 if l1 < 0 and l2 > 0, 1 otherwise; that is, if the lower bound l1 is negative (i.e., tends towards distrust), while the upper bound l2 is positive (i.e., tends towards trust), then ask for more trust information. Another possibility is h2(l1, l2) = 0 if l2 − l1 > δlmax, 1 otherwise; that is, if the range of opinions is too broad, ask for more information to narrow it down.
When entering a social context for the first time, an agent has no history, thus no portfolio he can use to prove his trustworthiness. Having no history is distinctive of both genuine newcomers, but also of cheating agents, that are repeatedly creating new identities to conceal past misbehaviours. To facilitate the start-up of an agent x without past, an agent a, that is already a member of the social context, may send out an introductory message [a, x, l, s, c, 0, t]SK a to the community. The interpretation of the message is the same provided for recommendations; however, the knowledge parameter k is set to zero, to warn the community that the trust opinion l is not based on a direct experience but, for example, on the opinion that a formed about x during a physical encounter. It will then depend on a's trustworthiness as a recommender whether, and how quickly, the newcomer will be accepted by the social context. In the absence of such an introductory message, the newcomer may offer (service-specific) incentives to encourage interactions.
Trust Evolution
As we discussed in Section 3.1, trust is predicted based on the perceived behaviour of agents in their past interactions. A fundamental component of a TMF is thus trust evolution, that is, the continuous self-adaptation of trust information kept in the agent's local environment. In this section, we discuss: an aggregation function Φ, used to maintain information about the trustworthiness of an agent as a service provider (i.e., aggregated trust information tuple), and a tacit information extraction function Ψ, used to maintain information about the trustworthiness of an agent as a recommender (i.e., tacit information tuple). Also, we illustrate how the maintenance of trust information plays a key role in the detection of malicious agents.
Aggregation Function Φ
The TMF of agent a uses the aggregation function Φ to update the perceived trustworthiness of a trustee b when a new direct experience between the two agents occurs. Even in case there is no interaction, the trustworthiness of the trustee may still be updated, based on his credentials. are used: first, h3 computes a trust value out of a trust range. For example, a cautious agent that tends to distrust other agents may choose h3(l1, l2) = l1 (that is, the lower trust value of a range); another agent who naturally tends towards trust may choose h3(l1, l2) = l2 instead. More generally, h3(l1, l2) = w1 * l1 + w2 * l2, with w1 + w2 = 1, 0 ≤ wi ≤ 1. Second, function h4 combines the three trust opinions to derive the new one. The general structure of h4 is the following: h4(l1, l2, l3) = w1 * l1 + w2 * l2 + w3 * l3, with w1 + w2 + w3 = 1, 0 ≤ wi ≤ 1, and l1 being b's trustworthiness as perceived by a in the just completed interaction, l2 being the opinion previously held by a about b, and l3 being b's expected trustworthiness based on the received credentials. Different choices of the weights wi correspond to different dispositions to trust. Examples include: w1 = 0.5, w2 = 0.5, w3 = 0, that is, equal weight is given to the newly perceived trustworthiness and the old opinion; this reflects a human disposition to change trust opinion fairly quickly. Another example is w1 = 1/n, w2 = (n − 1)/n, w3 = 0, with n = k/kmin, kmin representing the increment of knowledge happened in a single transaction; in this case, each of the n experiences happened between a and b has equal weight in computing the new trust l , thus reflecting a more cautious behaviour, not inclined to change opinion rapidly. In both cases, the credentials are not taken into account, as trust information coming from a direct experience (that is,l) is available. Apart from adjusting the trust level, the knowledge a has got about b is increased; also, the timestamp is updated to guarantee the freshness of the information.
The second equation considers the case where trust information about b is updated solely based on the newly received credentials C, without an interaction to have actually occurred (because, for example, the predicted trust was too low). In this case, a new trust opinion is computed solely based on l (i.e., the old trust opinion held by a, if any), and h3(Υn [[C] ] e ) (i.e., the predicted trustworthiness computed using the newly received credentials C). Note that, in this case, the trustor's knowledge is not incremented: only direct experiences contribute to uncertainty reduction.
The aggregated tuple can then be signed with the trustor's private key and used during the recommendation exchange protocol to answer request for recommendations. We assume that only credentials whose accreditor's quality qi is higher than η contribute to the newly synthesised trust value (see Figure 2 for a definition of qi) . Also, we assume that only fresh credentials are processed, that is, πt(cti) > πt(at), cti being a credential in C, and at the aggregated tuple we are updating; we are thus guaranteed that the same credential will not be processed more than once in different executions of the aggregation function (although some previously unprocessed credentials may be discarded). Also, we do not aggregate recommendations, to avoid situations where the same experience is processed more than once (for example, both as a credential and as a recommendation previously formed by aggregating the very same credential).
Tacit Information Extraction Function Ψ
After an interaction, the opinion that the trustor a holds about the trustworthiness of recommenders is updated. Maintaining the tacit information tuples updated is crucial, as it allows the trustor to discriminate between good and bad recommendations in future interactions. This activity is performed by the TMF using a tacit information extraction function Ψ whose formal definition can be found in Figure 4 . The tacit information tuple tti = [a, i, li, ki, ti] ∈ e, containing information about the trustworthiness li of agent i as a recommender, is updated based on: the new aggregated opinion l about b with whom a has just interacted, and the recommendation rti ∈ R about b that recommender i has given to a. Note that only recommendations (and not credentials) are processed at this stage: this is because we are interested in identifying agents with whom there is an affinity of (long-term) reasoning, while credentials refer to very specific transactions only. Also, to avoid considering the same recommendation many times, only recommendations rti with timestamp πt(rti) > πt(tti) are processed.
First, the discrepancy δli between the trustor's new opinion l and the recommender's opinion π l (rti) is computed. For example, if we consider time uncertainty to be infinitesimal, and the trustor's new opinion l to be 0.9, then the discrepancy of opinions with respect to recommendation rt = [x, b, 0.7, 0.8, t]SK x would be: δlx = 0.9 − h3(0.7 − |0.7 − 0.7 * 0.8|, 0.7 + |0.7 − 0.7 * 0.8|) = 0.9 − h3(0.56, 0.84); for h3(l1, l2) = (l1 + l2)/2, that would be δlx = 0.9 − 0.7 = 0.2. A new trust value l i for recommender i is then computed, based on both its past trustworthiness li and the discrepancy δli, using a customising function h5. An example of h5 is the following: if the discrepancy of opinions is lower than a tolerance parameter δmax, then i's trustworthiness is increased:
, with n = ki/kmin. Vice-versa, if the discrepancy of opinions is higher than the tolerance, the rec-
. In this case, an equal weight is given to every recommendation received from i in the past (cautious change of opinion); another possibility is to weigh the past as a whole and the new recommendation equally (rapid change of opinion),
. The lower the tolerance, the stricter is the trustor in selecting trustworthy recommenders. To limit the uncertainty of the information processed, as well as the computational complexity of the model, we do not consider recommendations about recommenders.
Both the aggregation function and the tacit information extraction function are non-monotone: they adjust the value of an agent's trustworthiness based on its behaviour, so that trust can dynamically be gained (when behaving well) and lost (when misbehaving). Trust information thus keeps evolving throughout the lifetime of an agent: the more frequently the agent interacts, the more accurate the agent's knowledge of the surroundings becomes, and vice-versa.
Malicious Agents Detection
In the social context, malicious behaviours refer to the spreading of: fake bad recommendations, when a single agent,
or a group of agents, start spreading false bad recommendations to damage some other agent; and fake good recommendations, when a group of agents aggregate and support each other to create a false good reputation. Detection of these behaviours is particularly difficult, as there is no definite way to distinguish between a simple difference of opinions, and a real threat. Punishment is even more difficult to perpetrate, because of the lack of a central authority to enforce it, and because of the anonymity of agents in mobile systems. We thus favour an anarchic model ("anarchy engenders trust and government destroys it" [14] ), where each agent is responsible for his own fate, as far as detection of malicious agents and punishment are concerned. The TMF supports the agent by providing a conflict detection mechanism that relies on the tacit information the TMF maintains on behalf of its agent. When agent a receives new recommendations from agent x about some agent b, the function Ψ is used to compare b's trustworthiness, as perceived by a, with that recommended by x: if conflicts of opinions with x happen sporadically, chances are that they are simply disagreements of trust opinions without any malevolence. However, if they happen frequently, x's trustworthiness as a recommender quickly drops towards −1, that is, total distrust. A boundary value η ∈ [−1, 1] for an agent's trustworthiness is defined, so that when x's trustworthiness drops below η, x becomes a suspect: recommendations coming from x are now discarded by the TMF, unless he recovers from this state. It is possible, in fact, that a mistake is made and a wrong opinion about x is formed; however, the more a interacts, the quicker and more likely the TMF will detect these mistakes, and thus have the chance to rectify them ("anarchy engenders cohesion" [14] ). In this model, the punishment for being a cheater is thus the loss of trust, which results in isolation from future interactions. After being isolated, an agent may very easily create a new identity; in this case, however, he will have no history, and thus other agents will be reluctant to trust him and start interactions with him. For an anarchic model to work, the assumption that the number of honest agents is higher than the number of malicious agents must hold. Also, the social context should circulate as much trust information as possible, so that concealments are revealed, and conflicts are more quickly detected. To achieve this goal, the recommendation exchange protocol could end with the newly created letters of presentation (step 4) sent to the social context (instead of using a private exchange between the two interacting agents), as part of a more socially inspired protocol. The way the protocol should run is not enforced by our model. Note that the mechanism described above allows detection of malicious recommenders, not of unreliable service providers, through analysis of the recommendations they provide.
Detection and isolation of unreliable service providers (that is, agents that fail to deliver a service as they have advertised) sits at the boundary of the social and transactional context and is not dealt with in this paper. An unsatisfactory transaction has repercussions on the trustworthiness of the service provider as shown by the aggregation function Φ; the extent to which a transaction is considered unsatisfactory, as well as the trust opinion that results from such a transaction, are outside the scope of this paper. Table 1 summarises the information that forms an agent's local environment: the data is continuously updated by the TMF using the aggregation function, the tacit information extraction function, and during the agent's interactions. Parameters and customising functions enable the customisation of the TMF according to the user's natural disposition to trust. Examples of customising functions have been discussed in the previous sections; it is beyond the scope of this paper to supply values for the parameters. 
Local Environment

DISCUSSION
We argue that the trust management model we have described in the previous section is particularly well suited for the mobile setting. First, it does not rely on trusted third parties, such as server repositories of trust information, or central authorities with special powers to detect and punish malicious agent; we favour an anarchic model instead, where each agent is solely responsible for his own fate.
Second, the resource demands imposed by an implementation of the framework can be minimal. Direct experiences, for example, are not individually stored in an agent's local environment, but aggregated so that a single tuple is kept, thus minimising memory requirements per agent; the number of agents for which trust information is locally maintained then varies, depending on the trustor's needs. Tuples can also be periodically purged (e.g., when outdated tnow − ti > T ), to further limit memory requirements. A similar consideration applies to the computational overhead: the more frequently the recommendation exchange protocol is run, the more accurate the trust information received, the higher the load; similarly, the more often the tacit information extraction function is computed, the more precise the selection of good recommenders, the higher the load. However, the frequency with which these tasks are executed is not prescribed in our TMF: each agent has the chance to decide how many resources to invest in trust management (e.g., depending on the risks inherent to the transactions, the resource capabilities of the device, etc.).
hTrust simulates the human approach to trust management in the computer world by means of the customising functions described in the previous section. A major concern is then how these functions are selected. We expect the user of the device to select the 'trust profile' that better describes his natural disposition, from a list of available profiles that are offered him by the trust management framework. Attached to each profile is a choice of what customising functions to use in practice. The level of abstraction of the profile can vary from very high level (e.g., 'distrust the unknown') for non-expert users, to very low (detailed) level for expert users. Further evaluation is necessary to derive guidelines to write profiles that are both effective and that minimise the burden imposed on the user of the device.
Apart from customising functions, the behaviour of our trust management model depends on a number of parameters, as listed in Table 1 . We have not discussed in this paper possible values of these parameters. Further experimentation is needed to empirically associate values to these variables. Initial results obtained during simulation of hTrust confirmed that different choices of these parameters impact on the accuracy of trust prediction as well as on resource usages. A unique optimal choice does not exist, as these parameters are domain-dependent; analysis of the target domain is thus necessary to associate meaningful values to these parameters.
RELATED WORK
The problem of trust management is very broad and it has been dealt with by different research communities. However, a common limitation to many approaches is that they deal with only a rather narrow subset of the overall trust management problem, or they provide solutions that are not consistent with human intuitions of trust (that is, they fail to capture various facets of human trust).
In distributed systems, the issue of trust has often been regarded as how to increase the client's trust in the behaviour of the server component. Signatures have been proposed to convey trust in the code (e.g., Signed Java Archives for Java and Authenticode for ActiveX); however, a signature can only convey trust in the identity of the signer: whether the signer is trusted or not, is an entirely different problem. Similar considerations apply to public key certificates [13, 2, 18, 7] ) that aim to solve the problem of authentication in distributed settings; however, a signed public key certificate does not tell you whether the owner is a straight person or a crook. To increase the client's confidence in the correctness of third party component's implementations, various solutions have been advanced. Proof-carrying code techniques [21] have been proposed to foster the acceptance of mobile agents; when the component implementation is inaccessible, and thus independent verification cannot be performed, approaches based on run-time component interface violations have been suggested (e.g., [9, 16] ). The computational overhead that these approaches impose is, however, unbearable for mobile devices and thus can only be applied to traditional distributed systems. More importantly, none of these approaches say much about the wider notion of an entity's trustworthiness: what trust is made of, how it can be formed, how it evolves.
Sultan [15] is a trust management framework that allows the specification, analysis and management of trust relationships. Its functioning is based on a central specification server where trust information is stored and used both for decision making and analysis. Although well-suited for use by the system administrator, its applicability to the mobile distributed setting is thus limited. PolicyMaker [5] takes a distributed approach to the problem of trust management; it binds keys to actions that the possessor of the key is trusted to do. When asked to determine whether a key is allowed to perform an action, PolicyMaker uses these bindings and a set of locally defined policies to answer. Similar distributed policy management approaches have been defined (e.g., [4, 10] ); however, issues such as trust evolution and subjective trust reasoning have not been tackled.
In [1] , a trust management model is proposed to give autonomous entities the ability to reason about trust, without relying on a central authority. Based on direct experiences and recommendations, each entity is able to predict trust, thus being responsible for its own fate. The approach relies on the assumption that entities will behave socially, exchanging recommendations when requested to do so, although no incentives are provided. Also, no mechanism to dynamically re-evaluate trust decisions is discussed. In [6] , a mechanism to detect and isolate misbehaving nodes at the network (routing and forwarding) level is proposed. The mechanism works even without assuming the cooperativeness of the nodes; however, decisions about what nodes to isolate are performed in a completely automatic and homogeneous way. While this approach may work well at the network level, its lack of subjectivity severely limits its applicability at the application level, where the user's disposition has to be accounted for.
As part of the SECURE project [11] , a trust management model has been defined that uses local trust policies to form and dynamically re-evaluate trust, based on past personal observations and recommendations. The computed trust values are then exploited to assess risks involved in the transaction, and then determine what behaviour the entity must adhere to. While moving a step closer to the definition of human trust than previous approaches, details about the local policies and the way they influence trust formation and evolution are missing. Moreover, the issue of malicious behaviours is left behind the scene. In [19] , a mechanism for the management of distributed reputation in mobile adhoc networks is presented, that is able to effectively detect malicious recommenders based on the idea of 'recommendation reputation', a very similar concept to the 'quality' pa-rameter we use in our model. We believe hTrust improves over this model, first by making a clear distinction between trust and knowledge, concepts that appear to be confused in [19] , and second by providing a more advanced credential exchange protocol than a simple periodic exchange. In [22] , a different approach to distributed reputation management is proposed, that prescribes the use of first-hand experiences only, to circumvent the limitations of recommendations. We believe it to be unfeasible to work with first hand experiences only, as this would quickly saturate the system; hTrust thus proposes an approach that combines both first-hand experiences and recommendations.
Various formalisms of trust have been proposed, in order to help reasoning about trust. In [17] , an opinion model based on subjective logic is discussed that can assign trust values in the face of uncertainty; however, the approach does not describe how to compute these values. In [8] , a formal model for trust formation/negotiation, evolution and propagation is presented; however, the protocols for exchanging recommendations and for dynamically re-evaluating trust are not provided. Similar considerations hold for the formal trust models described in [3] (based on probability theory) and [23] (based on lattice, denotational semantics and fixed point theory). In this paper, we have tackled the problem of trust management from an engineering point of view, providing an operational model that programmers can actually exploit to build trust-aware systems.
CONCLUSIONS
This paper has presented hTrust, a trust management model and framework that simplifies the development of trust-aware systems and applications. In particular, hTrust relieves the programmer from dealing with trust formation, trust dissemination, and trust evolution issues. Various sources of trust information are combined in hTrust: direct experiences, credentials and recommendations; precise algorithms have been illustrated to combine and maintain this information. While doing so, the framework makes sure to capture the actual human disposition to trust of the user of the mobile device, by means of customisable functions and parameters.
